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and necessity corresponding to differing systems of modal logic, so too there are presumably various slightly differing concepts of striving, doing, believing, and knowing, having differing formalizations.
We begin by assuming that striving, doing, believing, and knowing all have at least some fairly simple properties which will be described in what follows, and we leave open the question as to what further properties they have.
First of all, we assume that striving, doing, believing, and knowing are two-termed relations between an agent and a possible state of affairs. It is convenient to treat these possible states of affairs as propositions, so if I say that a strives for P, where p is a proposition, I mean that a strives to bring about or realize the (possible) state of affairs expressed by the proposition p. Similarly, if I say that a does P, where p is a proposition, I mean that a brings about the (possible) state of affairs expressed by the proposition p. We do not even have to restrict ourselves to possible states of affairs, because impossible states of affairs can be expressed by propositions just as well as can possible states of affairs. In the case of believing and knowing, there is surely no serious difficulty in regarding propositions as the things believed and known. So we treat all these concepts as twotermed relations between an agent and a proposition. In a similar way, the concept of proving could also be regarded as a two-termed relation between an agent and a proposition.
For purposes of simplification, the element of time will be ignored in dealing with these various concepts. A more detailed treatment would require that time be taken seriously. One method would be to treat these concepts as a three-termed relation between an agent, a proposition, and a time. Another method would be to avoid specifying times explicitly, but rather to use a temporal ordering relation between states of affairs. This latter method might be more in keeping with the theory of relativity, in either its special or general form.
As a further step of simplification we will often ignore the agent and thus treat each of the concepts under consideration as a class of propositions rather than as a two-termed relation. For example, by 'striving' we will mean the class of propositions striven for (that is, striven to be realized), and by 'believing' we will mean the class of propositions believed, relativizing the whole treatment to some unspecified agent. But the agent can always be specified if we wish to do so, and we can replace classes by two-termed relations.
A class of propositions (in particular such classes of propositions as striving, knowing, etc.) will be said to be closed with respect to conjunction elimination if (necessarily) whenever the conjunction of two propositions is in the class so are the two propositions themselves. For example, the class of true propositions is closed with respect to conjunction elimination Except for causal, logical, and deontic possibility, all the concepts so far regarded as closed with respect to conjunction elimination could perhaps also be regarded as closed with respect to conjunction introduction, or some varieties of them could. For present purposes, however, we do not need to commit ourselves on this matter except to say that truth and causal, logical, and deontic necessity are all indeed closed with respect to conjunction introduction.
A class of propositions will be said to be a truth class if (necessarily) every member of it is true. If a is a truth class, this fact about a can be expressed in logical symbolism by the formula, (p) [(p) -3 P]. The concepts truth, causal necessity, and logical necessity are clearly truth classes. It also seems reasonable to assume that doing, knowing, and proving are truth classes, and so we make this assumption. Thus, whatever is true or causally or logically necessary is true; and (as we assume) whatever is done, known, or proved is also true.
The following two theorems about truth classes will be applied to some of the above-mentioned truth classes in subsequent theorems. THEOREM 3. If an agent is all-powerful in the sense that for each situation that is the case, it is logically possible that that situation was brought about by that agent, then whatever is the case was brought about (done) by that agent.
Proof. Suppose that p is the case but was not brought about by the agent in question. Then, since doing is a truth class closed with respect to conjunction elimination, we conclude from Theorem 2 that there is some actual situation which could not have been brought about by that agent, and hence that the agent is not all-powerful in the sense described.
THEOREM 4. For each agent who is not omniscient, there is a true proposition which that agent cannot know.5
Proof. Suppose that p is true but not known by the agent. Then, since knowing is a truth class closed with respect to conjunction elimination, we conclude from Theorem 2 that there is some true proposition which cannot be known by the agent. THEOREM 5. If there is some true proposition which nobody knows (or has known or will know) to be true, then there is a true proposition which nobody can know to be true.
Proof. Similar to proof of Theorem 4. THEOREM 6. If there is some true proposition about proving that nobody has ever proved or ever will prove, then there is some true proposition about proving that nobody can prove.
Proof 
Notice that we do not have such theorems as p = [p & [q V '-.q]] and P = [p V [q & -q]].
Only a few of the axiom schemata listed above will be directly relevant in what follows. The ones most relevant are C2, C4, I 1, and I6. The property expressed by C3 reflects the fact that C is only partial causation. If C were total causation, then C3 would clearly by unacceptable. It should also be remarked that C need not be regarded as restricted to relating states of affairs that have space-time location, but may relate any state of affairs (e.g., a mathematical truth) to other suitable states of affairs. Otherwise, the sort of knowledge defined below would be knowledge only of states of affairs that have space-time location.
Using the relation C, a definition of doing in terms of striving will now be given. It is perhaps best to regard this definition merely as an axiom schema that provides a necessary and sufficient condition for doing, and similarly in subsequent definitions. As before, reference to the agent and to time are omitted for simplicity. of this striving is that p takes place. Using II, I6, C4, and properties of existence quantification, it is easy to show that this definition gives the result that doing is closed with respect to conjunction elimination.
DI. (does p) _ 3q[(strives for [p & q]) & [(strives for
A definition of knowing in terms of believing is now given:
D2. (knows p) =3q[p & q & [[p & q] C (believes [p & q])]].
This means that an agent will be said to know p provided that p and some (possibly other) situation q are both true, and provided that the fact that they are both true causes the agent to believe the fact that they are both true. Thus the known fact p must be causally efficacious ( The objection might be raised against the above definition of value that the agent must be assumed to be rational, since otherwise he might have all the relevant knowledge to enable him to make a choice in his own interest, and yet, being irrational, he would be caused by this knowledge to make some other choice and to strive for some outcome that would not be of value to him. One way, and perhaps the only way, to attempt to meet this objection is to maintain that all irrationality is due to lack of sufficient knowledge, so that the having of sufficient relevant knowledge already rules out any relevant amount of irrationality. According to this view, any sort of insanity would be curable simply by giving the patient sufficient knowledge of himself and of the world around him. This view would not deny that in practice there might be insuperable obstacles that prevent the communication of this knowledge to the patient, but the existence of such obstacles would not prove that irrationality was not essentially a lack of knowledge. This definition of value of course does not guarantee that there are any values in this sense, though it seems to me not unreasonable to assume that there may be values in this sense.
A more difficult problem is the problem of the comparison of values, that is, the problem of greater and less among values. This problem will not be dealt with here.
